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EXPERIMENTAL WORK-FOR-RELIEF PROGRAMS SUSTAINED

Aguayo v. Richardson
In recent years there has been growing public resentment of
federal aid given to indigents, resulting in greater emphasis on work2
for-relief programs.' Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
is one of the major vehicles through which federal monies are distributed to those unable to support themselves. This program provides
federal funds, "[flor the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent
children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives ... to needy
dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are
living."3 While state participation in the AFDC program is strictly
voluntary,4 when a state opts to participate the program it devises must
meet federal statutory criteria5 and must be approved by the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). However, pursuant to
section 1115 of the Social Security Act, 6 the Secretary may temporarily
waive federal requirements for experimental projects which are likely
to further the aims of the AFDC program.
In Aguayo v. Richardson,7 the Second Circuit upheld the Secretary's approval of two experimental New York State programs under
I Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3406
(U.S. Jan. 15, 1974) (No. 72-1416).
242 U.SC. §§ 601-44 (1970).
342 U.S.C. § 601 (1970). 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1970) defines a dependent child as one who
is "deprived of parental support or care," living in the home of a relative, and either
under 18 or under 21 and a full-time student.
4 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968); City of New York v. Richardson, 473
F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3655 (U.S. June 19, 1973) (No. 72-1451);
Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 CoLum. L. REV. 84, 85
nn.10-14 (1967).
5 The Supreme Court has recognized that in the area of welfare administration the
states "have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is
free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount
of funds it devotes to the program." King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968). Nevertheless, the states are not given unfettered discretion. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972). For example, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1970) restricts the states by requiring, inter alia, that
the plan be mandatory throughout the state, id. § 602(a)(1); that a fair hearing be held
before denial of aid, id. § 602(a)(4); that aid be furnished with reasonable promptness to
all eligible individuals, id. § 602(a)(10); provision of services "to maintain and strengthen
family life and to foster child development," id. § 602(a)(14); and provision for referral
to the Secretary of Labor of those eligible for work program, id. § 602(a)(19).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
In the case of any experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the
judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of . . .
[the AFDC program], in a State or states (a) the Secretary may waive compliance with any of the requirements of section
... 602 . . . of this title . . . to the extent and for the period he finds necessary to enable such State or States to carry out such project ....
7473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973). Judge Friendly authored the opinion and was joined
by Judges Waterman and Hays.
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AFDC: Public Service Work Opportunities Project (PSWOP) and
Incentives for Independence (IFI). The two programs challenged were
part of the ongoing effort by the state and federal governments to return
to the work force employable persons receiving assistance. At the
federal level, the Work Incentive Program (WIN)8 was enacted as
part of the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act. 9 In 1971, New
York enacted Work Rules1 0 which required employable' 1 AFDC recipients to obtain job counseling and training, and ultimately return
to the work force. 12 PSWOP and IFI were intended to further this aim.
Both experimental programs were approved by the Secretary of HEW
under section 1115 and were to run for one year.18
PSWOP was to operate in 14 of the 64 social services districts in
the state.' 4 Employable' 5 AFDC recipients in the 14 districts were required to register for job training and placement. Registered persons
were to be given either available jobs or a special PSWOP job created
842 U.S.C. §§ 630-44 (1970). This program was actually initiated in January of 1968,
and there is considerable evidence that it has not been a great success. See note 44 infra;
Note, The Failure of the Work Incentive (WIN) Program, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1971).
9 See U.S. ADVSORY COMM'N REPORT ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATUTORY
ANcE 5-7
CONTROLS AssociATEDrwnnr FEDERAL GRANTS FOR PUBT.c A
AND ADMINISrRAT

(1964).

10 The New York Work Rules are found in sections of the New York Social Services
Law and N.Y. Soc. SERvs. L. §§ 131, 164, 350 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
11 An AFDC recipient is considered employable under the New York Work Rules
unless he falls within one of the following classes:
a) a person viho is ill, incapacitated or of advanced age;
b) a person who resides so far from any of the projects under the work incentive
programs that he cannot effectively participate under any of such programs;
c) a child or minor attending school full time;
d) a person whose presence in the home is required because of the illness or incapacity of another member of the household;
e) a mother or other relative of a child under the age of six who is caring for the
child, provided that such person shall be advised of her option to register if she
so desires and shall be informed of the child care services which will be available
to her in the event she should decide so to register; or
f) the mother or other female caretaker of a child, if the father or another adult
male relative is in the home, is employable, and is in full compliance with all of
the registration, training and employment requirements of this section.
N.Y. Soc. SERvs. L. § 350(e) (McKinney Supp. 1972).

12 The New York Work Rules make it mandatory for all persons deemed employable
to pick up their assistance checks in person at an office of the Division of Employment
of the State Department of Labor. Failure to do so results in loss of assistance. Administrative Letter No. 71 PWD-43; New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 93 S. Ct.

2507 (1973).
18 The state originally asked that PSWOP run for three years. Approval was given
for one year with extension contingent upon evaluation of the first nine months' data.
478 F.2d at 1103 n.21.
14This encompassed approximately 25% of the state's welfare recipients. Id. at 1094.
15 See note 11 supra. A person declared employable may request a hearing. Refusal
to comply pending the hearing coupled with an adverse determination results in an automatic 30-day suspension of benefits even though the individual complies immediately
§ 585.7 (1972).
after the determination. See 18 N.Y.C.R.
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for them. In no case were they allowed to replace regular employees or
to earn more than their normal welfare benefits.
The state planned to institute IFI on a more limited basis. It was
slated to operate in three counties, one urban, one suburban, and one
rural, all of which were co-extensive with PSWOP districts. 16 IFI
differed from PSWOP in that participants were allowed to work full17
time and receive pay checks greater than their welfare benefits.

Failure to participate in this program resulted in a $66 per month
reduction of benefits. The IFI program also included a "Work Motivation for Youth"' 8 program and counseling for children with truancy
problems.
Aguayo involved a suit by three sets of plaintiffs against federal 19
and state 0 defendants. One set consisted of six individuals receiving
AFDC funds in the experimental districts. One of the experimental
districts, New York City, and its Commissioner of Social Services, Jule
Sugarman, comprised the second set. The third set included seven
welfare rights organizations. Each of the plaintiffs alleged that the
programs were invalid on both statutory and constitutional grounds.
The Second Circuit considered the problems of standing and
jurisdiction before reaching the merits of the case. 21 The court allowed
both the individual plaintiffs2 2 and Commissioner Sugarman 23 to raise
16 IFI would affect 2.5% of the state's AFDC recipients. 473 F.2d at 1095.
17 The state exempts a portion of IFI salaries in determining whether the participant
is also available for supplementary welfare assistance. However, in general, the exemption
is not as large as the analogous federal formula would allow. Id. at 1096 n.6.
18 This program provided part-time work to children over 16 attending school. Id.
at 1096.
19 The federal defendants consisted of the Secretary of HEW, the Administrator of
Social and Rehabilitation Services, the HEW Regional Commissioner, and HEW itself.
Id. at 1094.
20 The New York State Commissioner of Social Services and the Department of Social
Services were named as state defendants. Id.
21 In the district court, 352 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), Judge Bauman denied plaintiffs' motion for a temporary injunction. He found that the welfare organizations lacked
standing and both the City and Commissioner Sugarman had standing only to raise statutory claims. Federal jurisdiction over the statutory daims was found under § 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). The court also found the constitutional claims to be insubstantial and the statutory claims without merit.
22 The state defendants conceded that one of the individual plaintiffs, Hyacinth
Cadogan, was actually eligible for the program. This fact was sufficient to grant her
standing. The court also indicated that the remainder of the individual plaintiffs might
have standing since "the threat of compulsory enrollment would seem enough, except
perhaps when there is no rational basis for fear." 473 F.2d at 1099. However, since Mrs.
Cadogan had standing, the court found it unnecessary to decide this point.
23473 F.2d at 1100. Commissioner Sugarman was deemed to have standing because
he faced a "conflict between his oath to support the United States Constitution and his
duty under state law to carry out the New York projects." Id. See Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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constitutional and statutory claims. The City24 and the welfare organizations2 5 were restricted to their statutory claims. A jurisdictional
basis was found for the individual plaintiffs' and Commissioner Sugar27
man's constitutional claims2 0 and New York City's statutory claims.
The remaining claims for which standing had been found were allowed
28
to be heard under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
24473 F.2d at 1100, citing Williams v. Mayor & City Council, 289 US. 36, 40 (1933),
wherein the Supreme Court held that "a municipal corporation, created by a state for the
better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution, which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator."
The Aguayo court considered the question of whether a city might have standing to
assert constitutional claims against "federal" defendants as an open issue and declined
to pass upon it. 473 F.2d at 1100-01. Accord, City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d
923, 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 8655 (U.S. June 18, 1973) (No. 72-1451).
25 The district court had denied the welfare organizations standing. 352 F. Supp. at
466, citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). However, the Second Circuit noted
that the complaint here alleged that members of the organizations would suffer injury
since many were potential participants in the programs and that the remaining members
would suffer from the overall detrimental effect that the experimental programs might
have on the administration of the general welfare program. Accordingly, the court found
sufficient interest to grant some of the organizations standing to assert statutory claims
"under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 .... " 473 F.2d at 1099.
Turning to the question of whether the welfare organizations had standing to assert
their constitutional claims against the state defendants, the Second Circuit replied in the
negative. Id., citing Hague v. CIO, 307 US. 496 (1939). The court stated that the organizations were not "persons" aggrieved within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983. However, the continued validity of Hague is questionable in light of civil
rights cases which recognized the standing of the NAACP to raise certain constitutional
objections. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Ceremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958). The court distinguished these cases on the ground that parties
thereto were claiming violation of the constitutional right of association. 473 F.2d at
1099-1100. Moreover, the court believed that the language of the Supreme Court in
Sierra Club that "an organization whose members are injured may represent those
members in a proceeding for judicial review," 405 US. at 739, must be limited to suits
by organizations against federal officers and not extended to actions against state officials
under section 1983. 473 F.2d at 1100.
20473 F.2d at 1102. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
27473 F.2d at 1102. See 28 US.C. § 1331 (1970). The court felt that the City had
satisfied the $10,000 jurisdictional amount because the implementation of the programs
would cause a municipal expenditure of over $2.5 million. See generally Note, Federal
Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices,67 CoLumt. L. Rv.84, 111-15 (1967).
The district court had avoided the problem of jurisdictional amount by using section
10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 352 F. Supp. at 466. See note 21 supra. However,
the Second Circuit declined to follow suit, 473 F.2d at 1102, despite conflicting Second
Circuit decisions as to whether section 10 is an independent grant of jurisdiction. Compare Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 5-6 (2d Cir. 1966), with Wolf v. Selective Serv.
Bd., 372 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1967). The Aguayo panel chose not to resolve this undecided issue, 473 F.2d at 1102, citing Mills v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 995, 1001 n.9 (2d
Cir. 1972).
28473 F.2d at 1102. Under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, a party is permitted
to litigate, in a federal forum, both federal and state claims, arising out of a common
nucleus of operative fact provided an independent jurisdictional basis exists for the primary federal claim. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 US. 715, 725 (1966). The Second
Circuit has applied this doctrine liberally. See, e.g., Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075
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The plaintiffs' constitutional claims against the state defendants
were two-fold: unequal protection of the law and denial of due process.
The equal protection claims arose from the fact that only a portion
of those eligible for AFDC benefits were required to participate in the
experimental programs. 29 Applying the rational basis test, the court
refused to sustain the plaintiffs' arguments, concluding that "appel-

30
lants equal protection claims do not reach the level of substantiality."
The court went on to explain that a state's purpose "to determine
whether and how improvements can be made in the welfare system is
as 'legitimate' or 'appropriate' as anything can be." 3' 1 Moreover, Judge
Friendly commented that the equal protection clause should not preclude states from beneficial experimentation solely because it chose to
do so on a limited scale. 82
The major thrust of the plaintiffs' due process claims addressed
the vagueness of the procedures for determining eligibility and "good
cause" for declining a job opportunity. The court found potential due
process deprivation without considering these claims. It expressed concern with the constitutionality of the regulation 3 mandating a 30-day
suspension of benefits for any New York AFDC recipient who unjustifiably refused job training or placement, even where the recipient,

(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972) (pendent class action allowed without
federal jurisdictional amount based on section 1983 action by non-identical class); Leather's
Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971) (combined tort claim against
pier owner with admiralty action against shipowner); Astor Honor, Inc. v. Grosset &
Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971) (inclusion of defendant not named in federal
claim). See generally Second Circuit Note - Class Action as a Pendent Claim, 47 ST. JoHN's
L. REy. 348 (1972).
29 See notes 14 & 16 supra.
30 473 F.2d at 1109. The rational basis test requires that the classification in question
merely have a rational relationship to a permissible governmental purpose. See McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In determining that the rational basis test should be
applied, Judge Friendly considered the other possible tests. He rejected the compelling
interest test, which requires the state to justify its classification, on the ground that 'fundamental rights' were not at stake. 473 F.2d at 1109, citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970). Dandridge refused to apply strict scrutiny to a Maryland law setting a
maximum ceiling on AFDC payments despite recognition that the case involved "the
most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings." This case set the traditional
standard of judging state welfare laws when it said they must be "rationally based and free
from invidious discrimination." Id. at 1109.
The Aguayo court also took cognizance of what it believed was the development of
a third intermediary test by the Supreme Court. 473 F.2d at 1109. The test which appears
to be developing is that the "legislative means must substantially further legislative ends."
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
Judge Friendly concluded that even if this new test were applicable in Aguayo, it had
been satisfied. 473 F.2d at 1109.
31473 F.2d at 1109.
321d.

at 1110.

83 Id.; 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 385.7 (1972). See note 15 supra.
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subsequent to an adverse determination, agreed to comply. 4 The
plaintiffs viewed the effect of this regulation as a denial of the "fair
hearing"3 5 required by the Supreme Court's edict in Goldberg v.
Kelly.3 6 The Second Circuit, however, declined to pass upon this issue.
At the time Aguayo was being considered, the Supreme Court had
37
before it New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino
which challenged the New York Work Rules. The three-judge district
court in Dublino, in holding that the New York Work Rules were
pre-empted by federal legislation, had also considered the constitu0 8 Accordingly, the
tionality of the regulation in question in Aguayo.
Aguayo court modified the district court's denial of a temporary injunction and enjoined the state defendants from enforcing the questionable provision with respect to PSWOP and IFI until Dublino
39
could be finally decided.
The plaintiffs also raised certain statutory claims. They contended
that the Secretary of HEW exceeded his authority under section 1115
of the Social Security Act to allow such experimental programs, that
his approval had no rational basis, that his decision was based on
insufficient information, and that the approval was inadequate in its
failure to expressly waive compliance with certain provisions of the
Social Security Act. 40
The court rejected the first statutory claim that the Secretary had
exceeded his authority under section 1115 because the programs did
not further the aims of the Act. 41 Judge Friendly explained that section 401 of the Social Security Act 42 indicated Congress' intent to
enable recipients to become self-supporting to whatever extent pos34473 F.2d at 1110.
351d. at 1111.
86 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg held that a state must give a recipient a hearing in
accord with due process before terminating benefits.
87 93 S.Ct. 2507 (1973).

88 348

F. Supp. 290, 295 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).

at 1112.
In June of 1973, the Supreme Court, in Dublino, reversed and remanded to the district court, holding that state instituted work relief programs were not pre-empted by the
Social Security Act. 93 S. Ct. 2517. However, the Court made no mention of the 30-day
suspension provision. It is unclear at this time what will happen if no decision is made
with respect to it on remand.
39473 F.2d

40473 F.2d at 1103-08.
41Id. at 1103. The plaintiffs contended that the programs under attack could not be

deemed to further the aims of the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act, a necessary prerequisite to the operation of section 1115. See note 6 supra. They alleged that the
purpose of the AFDC program was to provide for needy children apd not to force the
individuals responsible for these children to work. Dismissing this contention, the court
stated that the plaintiffs had taken "too narrow a view of Congress' purpose." 473 Fd
at 1103.
42 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
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sible.43 The WIN program was cited as proof that Congress envisioned
some type of work-for-relief program. Moreover, it was the limited
application of WIN which had created the need for such programs as
PSWOP and IFI. 44
Similarly, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the Secretary cannot use section 1115 to waive any of the provisions of section
401 if a curtailment or denial of benefits would result. The court
reasoned that section 1115 gives wide discretionary powers to the Secretary and should not be construed narrowly as limiting him to waiver of
the statutory requirement for statewide uniformity. The only restriction provided for in the "waiver" section is that the Secretary must
"judge the project to be 'likely to assist in promoting the objectives'
'45
of the designated parts of the Social Security Act.
Plaintiffs next contended that the Secretary had no rational basis
for determining that the programs would further the aims of AFDC.
The court found that the Secretary, at the time of the decision, had
before him Action Memoranda for each of the programs which stated
the objectives of the demonstration projects" and that the achievement
of at least some of the goals stated would be sufficient reason to allow
the experimental programs. Evidence militating against achievement
of these goals was also before the Secretary in the form of a letter of
criticism of the programs from the Center on Social Welfare Policy
and Law.47 Consequently, the court held that "the materials before
43 473 F.2d at 1104.
44 New York State asserted

that in fiscal year 1971, 17,511 recipients were referred for
participation in the WIN program, but the federal government had only 9,600 enrollment
slots. Brief for Defendant at 38.17; Dublino v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 348 F.
Supp. 290 (W.D.N.Y. 1972). Of the estimated 150,000 WIN registrants for fiscal year 1973,
it was estimated that WIN would provide services to only 90,000, "of whom the majority
will not receive full job training and placement assistance." MANPOWrER ADMINISrRATION,
U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, CoNTRAcr 36-2-0001-188, MOD. No. 3, June 20, 1972. See Note, The
Failureof the Work Incentive (WIN) Program, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1971).

45473 F.2d at 1105.
46 Id. The Action Memoranda were prepared by the HEW and Judge Friendly interpreted them to provide:
[The results of PSWOP were expected to be:]
A. Decreased costs of public assistance.
B. Increased self-support of self-care of recipients.
C. Increased initiative of recipients.
D. Increased self-respect of recipients.
E. Increased community participation.
F. Improved public attitude toward public welfare.
[IFI objectives included:]
1. Employment of able-bodied adults.
2. Development and use of employability skills in young adults.
3. Education and motivation of school-age children.
Id.
47 The

letter stated that the objectives could not be achieved and criticized the
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the Secretary sufficed for 'a consideration of the relevant factors' by
48
him and that there was no 'clear error of judgment' on his part."
Thirdly, the plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary's action should
be set aside because he acted upon inadequate information, pointing
to the fact that approval was given before the receipt of requested
information concerning the fundamentals of the project. 49 A more
serious issue was raised by the contention that the Secretary had failed
to consider the capability of state and local agencies to administer the
experiments."0 The court summarily disposed of the former contention
as requiring too stringent an analysis for approval. As to the latter, it
apparently accepted the defendants' claim that the state had given adequate assurance of performance.r1 Moreover, the court gave the Secretary great latitude to approve such experiments "[o]nly if the materials
showed such administrative incapacity as to negate any appreciable
possibility of success would the Secretary's approval be arbitrary and
2
capricious."
Plaintiffs, relying on the district court's holding in Dublino that
WIN was the exclusive manner of compelling training or employment
for AFDC recipients, also contended that PSWOP and IFI were invalid
under the supremacy clause. The Aguayo court viewed the approval of
the experimental programs as an implied waiver of section 602(a)(19)
and said that requiring an express waiver would be a mere formality.
In view of the Supreme Court's recent reversal of Dublino 3 this issue
is now moot.
The disposal of the statutory claims in Aguayo was facilitated by
the standard of review employed by the court. When the focus of a
controversy is an administrative decision, such as the Secretary's apprograms because of the difference in payment, their coercive nature, lack of adequate
child care standards, vagueness as to the type of jobs, and the improbability that the
job experience would prove useful. Alternative methods were suggested for alleviating
public antagonism to public assistance. Id. at 1105-06.
48 473 F.2d at 1106.
49 The projects were approved on June 1, 1972, contingent upon receipt of additional
information relating to the availability of services to be provided, assurances that fair
hearing proceedings would be instituted, and that all work-related expenses would be
reimbursed. Id. at 1097-98.
590Appellants contended that the local welfare agencies, including those to participate
in the experimental projects, were already overwhelmed in attempting to administer the
regular AFDC program. Consequently, the burden of administering the additional projects
would only cause ineffective administration of both the experimental projects and the
regular program. Brief for Appellants at 92-93.
51473 F.2d at 1107.

Id.
See notes 37 & 39 supra. Dublino overturned decisions in two other circuits. See
Bueno v. Juras, 349 F. Supp. 91 (D. Ore. 1972); Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F. Supp. 1162
(E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1972).
92
93
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proval of PSWOP and IFI in the present case, the courts must first
decide what standard to use in reviewing that decision. While following the guidelines set down by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe5 "so far as applicable," Judge Friendly
added that a "lower threshold for persuasion" was needed when the
program was only an experimental one of short duration. Thus, the
Secretary was held to a liberal standard, which allowed him to rely on
his own judgment of the situation, 5 since no more specific statutory
guidelines were available.5 6
Aguayo promises to be of significant consequence in deterring
widespread attacks on work-for-relief programs. Recently, in Jefferson
v. Hackney,57 the Supreme Court emphasized that where states do not
run afoul of the Social Security Act or any of the provisions of the
Constitution, they will have considerable discretion in allocating AFDC
benefits. Thus, the essential framework within which these programs
must be scrutinized is whether they violate any statutory or constitutional proscriptions. The first major frontal attack on work-for-relief
programs came in Dublino. While the Supreme Court decided that
such programs were not pre-empted by the Social Security Act, it left
open the question of whether the state legislation involved was valid
under the Constitution and the Act. Aguayo has gone far in answering
this question. As to the constitutional issues, the Second Circuit has
decided that experimental work-for-relief programs do not violate the
equal protection clause. Admittedly, this aspect of the decision was
facilitated by the Supreme Court's holding in Dandridge v. Williams'
that "fundamental rights" are not involved in welfare cases. The
Second Circuit's holding on this question, and indeed its treatment of
the whole case, indicates an attitude that such programs will be treated
favorably.
54401 U.S. 402 (1971). In overturning Secretary of Transportation Volpe's decision
to build an interstate highway through Overton Park, the court outlined a tripartite
test for judicial review of administrative action. The administrator must have acted
(1) within his authority; (2) upon relevant factors, but without obvious error; and (3)
according to proper procedure. Plaintiffs contended that the Secretary's approval was
not made in accordance with these standards.
55473 F.2d at 1106. It was held permissible for the Secretary to allow his decision to
reflect current dissatisfaction with the welfare system and the possibility of future reduction in state aid. Id. at 1103.
5G In Overton Park there was a specific statutory guideline. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970)
provides that the Secretary "shall not approve any program or project" that requires the
use of any parkland "unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use
of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to
such park ..
"
57406 US. 535, 541 (1972).
58 397 US. 471 (1970). See note 30 supra.
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Of perhaps greater significance is the court's treatment of the
statutory claims. By broadly construing section 1115, the court has all
but precluded future statutory attacks on "experimental programs"
since the Secretary unquestionably can waive compliance with many
of the federal requirements. When coupled with the narrow scope of
judicial review used by the court it is apparent that a considerable
barrier has been erected to those wishing to attack such programs.
GEOGRAPHICAL CLAsslicATioNs OF WEiAPE DIsnuCTs ATTACKED

City of New York v. Richardson
Pursuant to the system for distribution of funds prescribed by the
Social Security Act of 1935,1 federal funds are made available to the
states on a "matching-fund" basis. Those states choosing to participate
in a program under the Act must submit a plan to the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) for approval.- New York
State's plan, as outlined in its Social Services Law, divides the state
into a number of welfare districts on a geographic basis. 4 According to
the financing system provided in the statute, each local district is to
pay 25 percent of its welfare costs, with an additional 25 percent contributed by the state. The remaining 50 percent is provided by the
federal government.5
Under New York's Social Services Law, New York City is designated as a local welfare district." Unfortunately for New York City taxpayers, the number of welfare recipients in the City is disproportionately high in relation to its population. The City, therefore, bears a
7
greater welfare burden than do other districts in the State.
In City of New York v. Richardson,s the City of New York and
142 U.S.C. §§ 801-06, 601-10, 1201-06, 1351-55 (1971).
2 In order for a state plan to be approved, it must comply with the provisions of
the Act and the rules and regulations promulgated by HEW. For example, the state
plan must be in effect "on a statewide basis in accordance with equitable standards for
assistance and administration that are mandatory throughout the state." 45 C..R. § 205.
120(a) (1978).
3 N.Y. Soc. SERv. L § 1 et seq. (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1972).
4 See N.Y. Soc. SERv. L. § 61 (McKinney 1966).
GSee N.Y. Soc. SERv. L. § 153 (McKinney 1966).
0 See N.Y. Soc. SERv. L. § 61(1) (McKinney 1966).
7 Statistics for 1969 reveal that although the residents of New York City comprise
only 45% of the state's population, 74% of the state's public assistance recipients live
within the city. It is also noted that while 3A9% of the state's residents outside New York
City receive public assistance, within the City, 12.52% of the population receive such
aid. See City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 930 (2d Cir. 1973).
8473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3655 (U.S. June 18, 1973) (No.
72-1451).

